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Chapter 18
Password Correction and Confidential
Information Access System
18.1 Introduction and Background
Following the trend of an increasing need for security and protection of confiden-
tial information, personal access codes and passwords are increasing in length with
the result that they are becoming more difficult to remember correctly. The system
described in this chapter provides a solution to this problem by correcting small
errors in an entered password without compromising the security of the access sys-
tem. Moreover, additional levels of security are provided by the system by associating
passwords with codewords of an error-correcting code and using a dynamic, user-
specific, mapping of Galois field symbols. This defeats password attacking systems
consisting of Rainbow tables because each user transmits what appears to be a ran-
dom byte stream as a password. A description of this system was first published by
the authors as a UK patent application in 2007 [1].
The system is a method for the encoding and decoding of passwords and the
encoding and decoding of confidential information which is accessed by use of these
passwords. Passwords may be composed of numbers and alphanumeric characters
and easily remembered names, phrases or notable words are the most convenient
from the point of view of users of the system.
Passwords are associated with the codewords of an error-correcting code and
consequently any small number of errors of an entered password may be automati-
cally corrected. Several additional parity symbols may be calculated by the system
to extend the password length prior to hashing so as to overwhelm any attacks based
on Rainbow tables. Dynamic mapping of code symbols is used to ensure a password
when first registered by the user is a codeword of the error-correcting code. In this
process sometimes a password, due to symbol contradictions, cannot be a codeword
and an alternative word or phrase, which is a codeword, is offered to the user by the
system. Alternatively, the user may elect to register a different password.
Feedback can be provided to users by the system of the number of errors corrected
for each user, re-entered password. Valid passwords are associated with a subset of
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the totality of all the codewords of the error-correcting code and an entered password,
may be confirmed to the user, as a valid password, or not.
Confidential information, for example Personal Identification Numbers (PIN)s,
bank account numbers, safe combinations, or more general confidential messages, are
encrypted at source and stored as a sequence of encrypted messages. Each encrypted
message is uniquely associated with a cryptographic hash of a valid codeword.
Retrieval of the confidential information is achieved by the user entering a pass-
word which is equal to the corresponding valid password or differs from a valid
password in a small number of character positions. Any small number of errors are
corrected automatically and feedback is provided to the user that a valid password
has been decoded. The valid password is mapped to a single codeword from a very
large number of codewords that comprise the error-correcting code.
On receiving a valid hash, the cloud sends the stored encrypted message that
corresponds to the valid codeword. The encryption key may be derived from the
reconstituted password in conjunction of other user entered credentials, such as a
fingerprint. The retrieved encrypted message is decrypted and the confidential infor-
mation displayed to the user.
Security is provided by the system at a number of different levels. Codewords of
the error-correcting code are composed of a sequence of symbols with each symbol
taken from a set of Galois Field (GF) elements. Any size of Galois Field may be
used provided the number of GF elements is greater or equal to the alphabet of the
language used to construct passwords. The mapping of alphabet characters to GF
elements may be defined uniquely by each user and consequently there are at least
q! possible mappings.
The number of possible codewords of the error-correcting code is extremely large
and typically there can be 10500 possible codewords. The number of valid codewords
in the subset of codewords is typically less than 102 and so the brute force chance of a
randomly selected codeword being a valid codeword is 110500 . Even if an attacker, or an
eavesdropper enters a valid codeword, the information that is obtained is encrypted
and the confidential information cannot be retrieved without the encryption key,
which requires the user’s credentials.
One possible application of the system is as an information retrieval app on a
smartphone with encrypted information stored in the cloud. For each registered user
a cloud-based message server has stored a list of cryptographic hashes of valid
codewords of the error-correcting code and an associated list of encrypted messages
or files. The mapping of password characters to codeword GF symbols is carried out
within the user’s smartphone and is not able to be easily accessed by an eavesdropper
or an attacker unless the smartphone is stolen along with user login credentials.
Additionally, the decryption of received encrypted messages is also carried out within
the user’s mobile phone. To access a long, hard to remember PIN or a long sequence of
cryptic characters, the user can enter the password, which is mapped to a GF symbol
stream, which is automatically corrected by the smartphone before cryptographic
hashing. The hash is encrypted, using a random session key exchanged using public
key cryptography, before being transmitted by the smartphone to the cloud. This
is to prevent replay attacks. If the codeword hash is correct, the cloud transmits
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the corresponding encrypted message or file, together with an acknowledgement.
The user’s smartphone receives the cipher text and decrypts it into the requested
information.
18.2 Details of the Password System
A block diagram of the system showing how user defined passwords are mapped to
sequences of GF symbols, encoded into codewords of an error-correcting code and
associated with encrypted confidential information is shown in Fig. 18.1.
We consider as an example, a system using passwords consisting of sequences of
up to 256 characters long with characters taken from the ANSI (American National
Standards Institute) single byte character set and an error-correcting code which is
a Reed–Solomon (RS) error-correcting code [2] described in Chaps. 7 and 11. RS
codes are MDS codes, constructed from GF(q) field elements. For the finite field
case, q is a prime or a power of a prime. In this example q = 28 and RS codewords
are constructed as sequences of GF(256) symbols. Codewords can be designed to be
any length up to q + 1 symbols long if the doubly extended version of the RS code
is utilised.
In general, any character set may be used in the system and any RS code may
be used provided the sequence of characters is less than or equal to the length of
the error-correcting code and each symbol of the error-correcting code is from an
alphabet size equal or greater than the alphabet size of the character set used to define
passwords. For maximum security, the mapping is chosen by a cryptographic random
number generator, with a seed provided by the user so that there is a high probability
that the resulting mapping table is unique to each user of the information retrieval
system.
It is convenient to use a binary base field and the Galois Field [3], GF(256), that is
used is an extension field consisting of 8 binary GF(2) field elements, generated by
residues of αn, n = 0 to 255 modulo 1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x8, where 1 + x2 + x3 +
x4 + x8 is an example of a primitive polynomial, plus the zero symbol G F(0).
As an example, the registered password “silver” is considered, whose correspond-
ing sequence of ANSI numbers is
115 105 108 118 101 114
As shown in Fig. 18.1, a mapping table is used to map these numbers to GF(256)
symbols. In this example, the error-correcting code that is used is the (256, 254, 3)
extended RS code which is capable of correcting either two erased symbols or one
erroneous symbol, and the code has 254 information symbols and 2 parity-check
symbols. The first two symbols are chosen as parity-check symbols and denoted
as p1 and p2, respectively. Putting the parity symbols first is convenient because
short codewords can easily by accommodated by assuming any unused information
symbols have value zero and therefore do not affect the parity symbols. A general
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codeword of this code as an extended GF(256) RS code is
p1 p2 x1 x2 x3 x4 . . . x254





1 1 1 . . . 1 1
1 α1 α2 . . . αn−1 0
1 α2 α4 . . . α2(n−1) 0
1 α3 α6 . . . α3(n−1) 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 αn−k−1 α2(n−k−1) . . . αn−k−1(n−1) 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
To provide more flexibility in symbol mapping, as described below, the generalised




η0 η1 η2 . . . ηn−1 ηn
η0 η1α
1 η2α
2 . . . ηn−1αn−1 0
η0 η1α
2 η2α
4 . . . ηn−1α2(n−1) 0
η0 η1α
3 η2α
6 . . . ηn−1α3(n−1) 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
η0 η1α
n−k−1 η2α2(n−k−1) . . . ηn−1αn−k−1(n−1) 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
The constants η1, η2, η3, . . . ηn may be arbitrarily chosen provided they are non-
zero symbols of GF(q).
With two parity-check symbols, only the first two rows of H are needed and we




1 1 1 1 . . . 1
0 1 α1 α2 . . . αn−1
]
Any pseudo random, one to one, mapping of ANSI numbers to GF(256) symbols
may be used. It is convenient to map always the null character, ANSI number = 32,
to the field element G F(0) otherwise each password would consist of 256 characters
and 256 password characters would have to be entered for each password. With the
null character mapping, a shortened RS codeword is equal to the full length codeword
since any of the G F(0) symbols may be deleted without affecting the parity-check
symbols. Consequently, short passwords may be accommodated very easily.
It is possible to choose a fixed one to one mapping of ANSI numbers to GF(256)
symbols and make this equal for all users but in this case many passwords on first
registering would fail as non-valid passwords, unless arbitrarily assigned characters
are allowed in the parity symbol positions. However, this is an unnecessary con-
straint on the system since codewords and passwords of different users are processed
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independently from each other. Moreover, security is enhanced if each user uses a
different mapping.
In the following example, dynamic mapping is used and the mapping chosen is
such that the information symbols of the RS codeword corresponding to “silver” are
equal to a primitive root α raised to the power corresponding to the ANSI number of
the character of the password in the same respective position as the codeword, except
for the null character which is set to G F(0). As the codeword has parity symbols in
the first two positions, and these symbols are a function of the other symbols in the
codeword, (the information symbols), the mapping of the first two characters needs
to be different. Accordingly, the codeword is
p1 p2 α108 α118 α101 α114 0 . . . 0








xi + p2 (18.2)
After substituting into Eq. (18.2) and then Eq. (18.1), it is found that p1 = α220 and
p2 = α57 and the complete RS codeword corresponding to the defined password
“silver” is
α220 α57 α108 α118 α101 α114 0 . . . 0
The RS codeword encoder is shown in Fig. 18.1 and uses the mapping of defined
password characters to GF(256) symbols as input and outputs to the mapping table,
as shown in Fig. 18.1, the mapping of the parity symbols. Accordingly, the mapping
of the first two characters of the password is that ANSI number 115 is mapped to
α220 and ANSI number 220 is mapped to α115 and the mapping table is updated
accordingly, as indicated in Fig. 18.1 by the two directional vectors. Of course in
order for these mappings to be valid, neither ANSI number 115, nor ANSI number
220, nor GF(256) symbols α220, nor α115 must be already mapped otherwise the
mapping of prior defined passwords will be affected.
As new passwords are defined and new valid codewords calculated, it is rela-
tively straightforward to amend the list of assigned and unassigned mappings of the
mapping table in a dynamic manner. This dynamic mapping assignment is a feature
in that it not only increases the range of possible passwords but has a secondary
advantage. This secondary advantage arises from the mapping of entered passwords
and the subsequent error-correction decoding. Any entered password character not
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having an assigned ANSI number cannot be part of a valid password and accordingly
the corresponding GF(256) symbol is marked as an erased symbol. Since on aver-
age, twice as many erased characters can be corrected by an error-correcting code
compared to the number of correctable erroneous characters, a distinct advantage
arises.
The confidential information corresponding to “silver” is, for example:
“The safe combination is 29 53 77 22” and as shown in Fig. 18.1 confidential infor-
mation input to the system is encrypted using an encryption key. The encryption key
is usually chosen from a master encryption key, unique to each user. Once input, the
confidential information is only retained in encrypted form. The encrypted confiden-
tial information associated with “silver” forms the encrypted text:
AjelMHjq+iw&ndˆfh)y!"16f@h:G#)P7=3Mq|2=0+YX?z/+6sGs+2|Zl
-GWp<)g/,HDZ)H4D7F/j+gFAqYlFcXZPMY6$3"/
As shown in Fig. 18.2, in order to retrieve this confidential information, the user
re-enters their password. However, this entered password is allowed to contain errors.
For example the password “solver” may be entered and has the corresponding ANSI
number sequence:
115 111 108 118 101 114 . . . 32 32 32
Following input of the password, as shown in Fig. 18.2, the mapping table is used
to map the entered password into the GF(256) sequence
α220 α88 α108 α118 α101 α114 0 . . . 0
The decoder for the RS code, as shown in Fig. 18.2, decodes the sequence of GF(256)
symbols, resulting from the mapping using the mapping table, into a codeword of
the error-correcting code. In order to carry this out, two syndromes, s1 and s2, are









αi xi + p2 (18.4)
The two syndromes, in this case, are found both to be equal to α43 indicating there is
an error in the second information symbol position of the codeword and this error is
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α43. If the same error had been in the third symbol position, say, the two syndromes
would have been equal to α43 and α44.
Subtracting the error, α43, from the entered symbol (after mapping) of α88 pro-
duces the correct GF(256) symbol α57. The codeword of the RS code is thus corrected
to be
α220 α88 α108 α118 α101 α114 0 . . . 0
Applying the inverse mapping to each GF(256) symbol produces the ANSI number
sequence 115 105 108 118 101 114 32 32 32 32…32
115 105 108 118 101 114 32 32 32 32 . . . 32
This corresponds to “silver”, the corrected entered password.
As shown in Fig. 18.2, the decoded codeword is compared to the list of valid
codewords of the error-correcting code. The codewords of the error-correcting code
are split into two groups, the valid codewords and rest of the codewords, invalid
codewords. The codeword
α220 α88 α108 α118 α101 α114 0 . . . 0
is verified as a valid codeword associated with the encrypted confidential information:
AjelMHjq+iw&ndˆfh)y!"16f@h:G#)P7=3Mq|2=0+YX?z/+6sGs+2|Zl-GW
p<)g/,HDZ)H4D7F/j+gFAqYlFcXZPMY6$3"/
As shown in Fig. 18.2, this is decrypted, using the encryption key and the confidential
information is output: “The safe combination is 29 53 77 22”
In a further extension of the system, as shown in Fig. 18.3, the encoded RS code-
word, denoted as cx which results from the mapped, defined password is convolved
with a fixed RS codeword denoted as
yx = αy0 + αy1 x + αy2 x2 + αy3 x3 + · · ·αy255 x254
Note that the standard polynomial-based RS codes of length q − 1 are used in this
system variation. The fixed RS codeword is the result of encoding a random set of
GF(256) information symbols. The reason for doing this is to ensure that the resulting
codeword after convolution, rx
rx = cx.yx modulo 1 + x255 (18.5)
does not have a long sequence of G F(0) symbols which may compromise the security
of the information retrieval system. Correspondingly, it is the codeword rx which is
associated with the encrypted message. As shown in Fig. 18.4, retrieval of encrypted
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information is carried out by entering a password. After the decoding of the sequence
of GF(256) symbols resulting from the mapping of the entered password, using
the mapping table, into a codeword of the error-correcting code, this codeword is
convolved with the fixed codeword as shown in Fig. 18.4. The resulting codeword is
compared to the list of valid codewords of the error-correcting code.
One feature, particularly with long passwords hard to remember, is that a partially
known password may be entered, deliberately using characters known not to be
contained in the mapping table, in order for the system to fill in the missing parts of
the password. Characters may be reserved for this purpose. As a simple example, the
password may be entered “si**er” where it is known that the character * will not be
contained in the mapping table, because the character * had been previously defined
as a reserved character. The corresponding codeword is
α220 α88 erase1 erase2 α
101 α114 0 . . . 0
where erase1 and erase2 represent erased (unknown) GF(256) symbols. The decoder
for the RS (256,254,3) error-correcting code may be used to solve straightforwardly
for these erased symbols. The first step is to produce a reduced echelon parity-check
matrix with zeros in the columns corresponding to the positions of the erased symbols,
bar one. The procedure is described in detail in Chap. 11.




1 1 1 1 . . . 1
α1 (1 + α1) 0 (α2 + α1) . . . (αn−1 + α1)
]
Now, the erased symbol erase2 may be solved directly using the second row of He
α220α1 + α88(1 + α1) + erase2(α2 + α1) + α101(α3 + α1) + α114(α3 + α1) = 0
and
erase2 = (α2 + α1)q−2α221 + α88 + α89 + α104 + α102 + α117 + α115 = α118
Using the first row of He, erase1 can now be solved
α220 + α88 + α118 + erase1 + α101 + α114 = 0
and
erase1 = α220 + α88 + α118 + α101 + α114 = α108
With the reverse mapping the complete password is reconstituted allowing the
encrypted information to be retrieved as before.














































































































































































18.2 Details of the Password System 463
The advantage of defining erasures is that each unknown symbol may be solved
for each parity symbol in the RS codeword. Having a relatively large number of parity
symbols allows several parts of the entered password to be filled in automatically.
Obviously security is compromised if this procedure is used to extreme.
18.3 Summary
This chapter has described the use of Reed–Solomon codes to correct user mistakes or
missing parts of long entered passwords. The system is ideally suited to a smartphone-
based encrypted, information retrieval system or a password-based authentication
system. Dynamic, user-specific mapping of Galois field elements is used to ensure
that passwords, arbitrarily chosen by the user, are valid codewords. A typical system is
described based on GF(256) and the ANSI character set with worked examples given.
Security is also enhanced by having, user-specific, Galois field symbol mapping
because, with long passwords, this defeats Rainbow tables.
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